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Abstract. Micropayments are increasingly being adopted by a large
number of applications. However, processing micropayments individu-
ally can be expensive, with transaction fees exceeding the payment value
itself. By aggregating these small transactions into a few larger ones, and
using cryptocurrencies, today’s decentralized probabilistic micropayment
schemes can reduce these fees. Unfortunately, existing solutions force mi-
cropayments to be issued sequentially, thus to support fast issuance rates
a customer needs to create a large number of escrows, which bloats the
blockchain. Moreover, these schemes incur a large computation and band-
width overhead, which limit their applicability in large-scale systems.
In this paper, we propose MicroCash, the first decentralized probabilistic
framework that supports concurrent micropayments. MicroCash intro-
duces a novel escrow setup that enables a customer to concurrently issue
payment tickets at a fast rate using a single escrow. MicroCash is also
cost effective because it allows for ticket exchange using only one round
of communication, and it aggregates the micropayments using a lottery
protocol that requires only secure hashing. Our experiments show that
MicroCash can process thousands of tickets per second, which is around
1.7-4.2x times the rate of a state-of-the-art sequential micropayment sys-
tem. Moreover, MicroCash supports any ticket issue rate over any period
using only one escrow, while the sequential scheme would need more than
1000 escrows per second to permit high rates. This enables our system
to further reduce transaction fees and data on the blockchain by ∼ 50%.
1 Introduction
Micropayments, or payments in pennies, are increasingly being used by applica-
tions as diverse as ad-free web surfing, online gaming, and peer-assisted service
networks [33]. This paradigm allows participants to exchange monetary incen-
tives at a small scale, e.g., pay per minute in online games. Such a fine-grained
payment process has several advantages, including a great deal of flexibility for
customers who may stop a service at any time. In addition, it reduces the finan-
cial risks between mutually-distrusted participants, where there is no guarantee
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?? Supported by NSF CCF-1423306 and NSF CNS-1552932.
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that a client will pay after being served, or that a server will deliver service when
paid in advance.
However, processing these small payments individually can incur high trans-
action fees that exceed the few pennies received. For example, the average base
cost of a debit or credit card transaction in the US is around 21 to 24 cents,
and 23 to 42 cents [9,10], respectively. In cryptocurrencies such a fee could be
even higher, e.g., above $1 in Bitcoin [7]. Beside this financial drawback, han-
dling micropayments individually can impose a huge workload on the system,
and may explode the log needed for accountability purposes. Thus, there is a
need for a payment aggregation mechanism that records fewer transactions with
values that still compensate properly for the small payments received to date.
Probabilistic micropayment schemes have emerged as a solution that fits the
criteria outlined above [39,35,31,36]. In these models, the amount of required
payments is locked in an escrow and micropayments are issued as lottery tickets.
Each ticket has a probability p of winning a lottery, and when it wins, produces
a transaction of β currency units. This means that, on average, only one large
transaction is processed out of a batch of 1p tickets. Unfortunately, these early
proposals rely on a trusted party to audit the lottery and manage payments.
Such a centralized approach may increase the deployment cost and limit the use
of the payment service to systems of fully authenticated participants [25].
As cryptocurrencies evolved, a number of initiatives have attempted to con-
vert these schemes to distributed ones [33,25]. This is done by replacing the
trusted party with the miners, and utilizing the blockchain to provide pub-
lic verifiability of system operation. Yet, these approaches have several draw-
backs that may hinder their usage in large-scale systems. First, they force a cus-
tomer to issue micropayments sequentially using the same escrow. This means
a new ticket cannot be issued until it is confirmed that the previous one did
not win, which requires a merchant to report the lottery outcome back to the
customer. To issue tickets at a fast rate under this structure, this customer
needs to create a large number of escrows, which increases the amount of data
on the blockchain. Second, these schemes rely on computationally-heavy cryp-
tographic primitives [33,25], and several rounds of communication to exchange
payments [25], which incur a large overhead. Such performance issues reduce the
potential benefits of micropayments.
This paper proposes a solution to these drawbacks by introducing MicroCash,
the first decentralized probabilistic framework that supports concurrent micro-
payments. MicroCash features a novel payment setup that allows a customer to
issue micropayments in parallel and at a fast rate using a single escrow that can
pay many winning tickets. This is achieved by having the customer specify the
total number of tickets it may issue, and provide an escrow balance that covers
all winning tickets under its payment setup.
MicroCash is also cost effective because it introduces a lightweight non-
interactive lottery protocol. This protocol requires only secure hashing and allows
a payment exchange using only one round of communication without demanding
the merchant to report anything to the customer. Furthermore, this protocol is
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the first to eliminate situations where all lottery tickets may win or lose the
lottery. Although the probability of these events is very small, it may discourage
customers from using the system since such a possibility, i.e., to pay much more
than the expected payments, may impose a strong psychological obstacle [31].
Moreover, accounting for the worst case when all, or almost all, tickets win re-
quires a large escrow balance, which increases the collateral cost. Our protocol
solves this problem by selecting an exact number of winning tickets each round
(where a round is the time needed to mine a block on the blockchain). All tickets
issued in the same round are tied to a lottery draw value in a future block on
the blockchain, which is used to determine the set of winning tickets through an
iterative hashing process. The security of this protocol, and the whole system, is
enforced using both cryptographic and financial techniques. The latter requires
a customer to create a penalty escrow that is revoked upon cheating, with a
lower bound derived using a game theoretic modeling of the system.
To evaluate its efficiency, we experimentally test MicroCash’s performance
and compare it to MICROPAY [33], a state-of-the-art sequential micropayment
scheme. Our results show that a modest merchant machine in MicroCash is able
to process 2,240 - 10,500 ticket/sec, which is around 1.7-4.2x times the rate in
MICROPAY, with 60% reduction in the aggregated payment size. Furthermore,
a modest customer machine in MicroCash is able to concurrently issue more than
33,000 ticket/sec using one escrow over any period, while MICROPAY requires
the creation of more than 1000 escrows per second to support a comparable issue
rate. This allows MicroCash to reduce transaction fees and amount of data on
the blockchain in a video delivery and online gaming applications by ∼ 50%.
2 Related Work
To orient readers to the current state-of-the-art in probabilistic micropayments,
in this section we review prior work done in this area. In addition, we review an
alternative payment aggregation mechanism, called payment networks [26,34],
focusing on its limitations when used to handle micropayments.
Probabilistic Micropayments. The idea of probabilistic micropayments dates
back to the seminal works of Wheeler [39] and Rivest [35]. In these schemes, a
customer and a merchant run the lottery on each ticket by using a simple coin
tossing protocol. Thus, there is a chance than more, or less, tickets than expected
may win. All of these schemes rely on a centralized bank to track and authorize
payments. This imposes additional overhead on the users who have to establish
business relationships with this bank. Also, it limits the use of the service to
only fully authenticated users. Therefore, this centralization issue is viewed as
the main reason for the limited adoption of such solutions [25].
Systems using cryptocurrency-based probabilistic micropayments have the
potential to overcome both the cost and efficiency problems inherent in ear-
lier schemes. To the best of our knowledge, only two such schemes have been
proposed to date in the literature, MICROPAY [33] and DAM [25].
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MICROPAY translates the scheme of Rivest [35] into an implementation on
top of a cryptocurrency system. Instead of using an authorized bank account,
customers create escrows on the blockchain that they use to issue lottery tickets.
For the lottery protocol, MICROPAY implements a similar interactive coin toss-
ing protocol, and adds an alternative non-interactive version that reduces the
communication complexity (a merchant still has to report the lottery result back
to the customer). However, the latter is computationally-heavy since it requires
public key cryptography-based operations and a non-interactive zero knowledge
(NIZK) proof system. Moreover, MICROPAY only supports sequential micro-
payments as mentioned earlier. DAM shares similar constraints, but it adds the
feature of preserving user privacy (not like MICROPAY that is public), where
it extends Zerocash [38] primitives to implement anonymous micropayments.
We believe that the added blockchain transactions due to sequential pay-
ments, coupled with the high computation cost, point to the need for optimized
approaches that support concurrent micropayments at a lower overhead. This
need is the motivation behind building MicroCash.
Payment Channels and Networks. This payment paradigm was originally
developed to handle micropayments in Bitcoin [6], where it relies on a similar
concept of processing most of the small payments locally. Later on, it was geared
to enhancing the scalability of cryptocurrencies [29,26,34,32,28,30], where utiliz-
ing off-chain processing to reduce on-chain traffic helps increase the transaction
throughput at a lower overhead.
A payment channel is a contract between a customer and a merchant tied to a
shared escrow fund. The ownership of this fund is adjusted over time based on the
off-chain transactions, or local payments, made to date. Only two transactions
are logged on the blockchain per channel, the opening transaction and the closing
one that expresses the latest state of the fund ownership.
In general, payment channels and networks suffer from the high collateral
cost of setting up multiple escrows when constructing payment paths between
transacting parties. These costs may indirectly push the network towards cen-
tralization [13]. This is because only wealthy parties can afford multiple escrows
to establish payment channels, and hence, most users will rely on these parties,
or hubs, to relay the off-chain transactions. In addition, each hub on the path
charges a fee to relay payments. With micropayments, such a setup would be
infeasible because these fees could be much larger than the payments themselves.
Probabilistic approaches, on the other hand, are more flexible in allowing sev-
eral parties to be paid using the same escrow. And by doing so, they reduce the
collateral cost and eliminate any fees when exchanging lottery tickets. Hence,
distributed probabilistic micropayments provide a better solution for handling
small payments in cryptocurrency systems.
3 Threat Model
The reliance on off-chain transactions in distributed probabilistic micropayments
creates the potential for various types of attacks. In this section, we outline a
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threat model that accounts for these attacks, which guided the design of Micro-
Cash. In developing this model, we make the following assumptions:
– No trusted party exists.
– Participants are rational, meaning that they may follow the protocol without
violation, or deviate from it, based on what will maximize their utility gain.
– The underlying cryptocurrency scheme is secure in the sense that the major-
ity of the mining power is honest. This means that the confirmed state of the
blockchain contains only valid transactions, and that an attacker who tries
to mutate or fork the blockchain will fail with overwhelming probability.
– Hash functions are modeled as random oracles, and the hash values of the
blocks on the blockchain are modeled as a uniform distribution.
– Efficient adversaries cannot break the basic cryptographic building blocks
(SHA256, digital signatures, etc.) with non-negligible probability.
– Communication between customers and merchants takes place over a channel
that provides integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity, such as TLS/SSL.
We used ABC [22] to build a threat model for MicroCash (a detailed version
of this threat model is available online [19]). During this process, we identified the
assets to be protected in distributed probabilistic micropayments, which include
the escrows, the lottery tickets, and the lottery protocol. Then, by analyzing the
security requirements of these assets, we produced the broad threat categories
in such systems. Our list includes the following:
– Escrow overdraft: A customer creates a payment escrow insufficient for
honoring the winning lottery tickets, or creates a penalty deposit that does
not cover the cheating punishment imposed by the miners. Such a threat
could be the result of creating small balance escrows, or front running attacks
in which a customer withdraws the escrows before paying.
– Duplicate ticket issuance: A customer issues lottery tickets with the same
sequence number to several merchants. This leads to issuing more tickets
than the escrow can cover, allowing the customer to obtain more service
than it pays for.
– Invalid payments: A malicious customer hands merchants lottery tickets
that do not comply with its payment setup or with the system specifications.
Because these tickets will be rejected by the miners if they win the lottery,
the customer can avoid paying merchants.
– Unused-escrow withholding: An attacker prevents or delays a customer
from withdrawing its unused escrows. For example, merchants may delay
claiming their winning lottery tickets to keep the payment escrow on hold.
– Lottery manipulation: An attacker attempts to influence the outcome of
the lottery draw, and hence, bias the payment process.
– Denial of service (DoS): This is a large threat category that threatens
any distributed system. This work focuses on attacks related to the payment
process. For example, an attacker may monitor the network and drop all
lottery tickets to disturb the service.
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Note that dealing with malicious merchants who collect lottery tickets and
do not deliver a service is outside the scope of MicroCash. The same is true for
dealing with malicious customers who may obtain the service without paying. In
this work, we are concerned with the payment scheme design, rather than how
to exchange service for a payment, which is part of an application design.
In addition, MicroCash does not address payment anonymity. Addressing this
issue securely, while preserving the low overhead of MicroCash, is a direction of
our future work.
4 MicroCash Design
Having outlined the security threats to probabilistic micropayments, and the
limitations of existing solutions, this section presents the design of MicroCash, a
concurrent micropayment system that addresses these issues. We start with an
overview of the system, followed by a more detailed technical description.
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Fig. 1: Flow of operations in MicroCash.
A high level illustration of MicroCash, that also captures the remainder of
this section’s organization, is found in Figure 1. As shown, during the payment
setup (Step 1, Section 4.1), each customer issues a transaction creating two
escrows: payment and penalty. The customer uses the former to make payments
in the form of lottery tickets, while the miners use the latter to financially pun-
ish this customer if it cheats. Payment exchange starts as soon as the escrow
transaction is confirmed on the blockchain. At that time, merchants can check
the escrow setup before transacting with the customer (Step 2). In exchange for
the delivered service, the customer issues these merchants lottery tickets accord-
ing to a ticket issue schedule that limits the ticket issue rate over a set period
(Step 3, Section 4.2). To redeem these payments, a merchant keeps each of its
tickets until the lottery draw time of this ticket. It then observes a value derived
based on the block mined at that time to determine if this ticket won (Step 4,
Section 4.3). If it is a winning ticket, the merchant can claim currency from the
customer’s escrow during the ticket redemption period (Step 5, Section 4.4).
This interaction continues until the end of the escrow lifetime. At that time, and
when all issued tickets expire, the customer can spend any remaining funds.
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4.1 Escrow Setup
MicroCash introduces a novel escrow setup that allows multiple winning tickets
to be redeemed, which enables both concurrent ticket issuance and reduces the
amount of on-chain escrow-related data. This setup provides techniques to de-
termine the needed escrow balance to cover all concurrent tickets, and to track
the issuance of these tickets in a distributed way.
Escrow creation. As an off-chain payment scheme, MicroCash must ensure
that customers can and will pay. This includes honoring winning tickets, and,
if caught cheating, complying with a stipulated financial punishment. To satisfy
these requirements, each customer must create payment and penalty escrows
with sufficient funds to cover both eventualities.
Given that each payment escrow must be tied to a penalty escrow, a customer
sets up both using one creation transaction. This transaction provides funds
to be locked under each escrow balance, where we refer to the payment and
penalty escrow balances as Bescrow and Bpenalty, respectively. It also configures
a set of parameters that influence how the value of both Bescrow and Bpenalty are
computed, and how they are to be spent. These parameters, whose values are
specified by the customer possibly after negotiating with the merchants, include
the following:
– The lottery winning probability p.
– The currency value of a winning lottery ticket β.
– The ticket issue rate tktrate, which is the maximum number of tickets a
customer is allowed to hand out per round. This is used to calculate which
ticket sequence numbers are valid within each ticket issuing round.
– A lottery draw round length, denoted as drawlen, such that drawlen ∈ {1, . . . , c}
for some small system parameter c. The customer has to configure drawlen,
p, and tktrate in a way that makes ptktrate drawlen of an integer value (this
is the number of winning tickets in a lottery draw).
– The set of beneficiary merchants that can be paid using the escrow, where
the size of this set is denoted as m.
Computing Bescrow and Bpenalty based on the above parameters proceeds as
follows. To permit concurrent micropayments, Bescrow must be large enough to
pay all winning tickets tied to an escrow. Given that each winning ticket has
a value of β currency units, and that there are ptktrate drawlen winning tickets
per drawlen rounds, Bescrow can be simply computed as follows (where lesc is the
escrow lifetime in rounds, and there are lesc/drawlen lottery draws):
Bescrow = βptktratelesc (1)
For Bpenalty, we compute a lower bound for this deposit using an economic
analysis that accounts for the additional utility gain a customer may obtain by
cheating. This bound is given by the following equation:
Bpenalty > (m−1)pβtktratedrawlen
(
1− p
1− ρ−1 +drawlen
(
(1−p)(ddraw−1)+dredeem
))
(2)
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where ddraw is the lottery draw period in rounds, dredeem is the ticket redemption
period in rounds, and ρ =
(
a
b
)
such that a = tktratedrawlen and b = (1 − p)a
(more about these parameters in Section 4.3). This lower bound ensures that
the financial punishment exceeds the additional utility gain of cheating, and
hence, makes cheating unprofitable compared to acting honestly. The full details
of deriving this bound are found in Section 5.
Verifying the correctness of a payment setup is performed by the miners upon
receiving the escrow creation transaction. First, they verify that the customer
owns the input funds. Then, the miners use Bescrow to compute the escrow
lifetime as lesc =
Bescrow
βptktrate
. After that, they check that both lesc and ptktrate
drawlen are of integer values, drawlen is within the allowed range, and that lesc
is multiples of drawlen. Lastly, the miners verify that Bpenalty satisfies the bound
given above. If all these checks pass, the miners add the escrow transaction to
the blockchain. Otherwise, they reject the escrow by dropping its transaction.
Escrow management. In MicroCash, the escrow funds can be spent only for a
restricted set of transactions. This set includes claiming winning tickets, present-
ing proofs-of-cheating, and (after the escrow lifetime is over) enabling a customer
to spend its unused escrow funds.
To track the locked funds, miners maintain a state for each escrow in the
system. This state includes the following:
– The ID of the escrow, which is a random value generated by the miner who
adds the escrow creation transaction to the blockchain.
– The balances of both the payment and penalty escrows.
– The public key of the owner customer, which is used to verify all signed
tickets that are issued using this escrow.
– The values of p, β, lesc, tktrate, drawlen, and the set of beneficiary merchants
(both the public key of each merchant and a corresponding index).
– An escrow refund time, denoted as trefund, at which the customer can spend
any remaining funds. Miners set this time to be equal to the expiry time of
the tickets issued in the last round of an escrow lifetime.
Ticket issuance using an escrow must follow a schedule based upon the tickets
sequence numbers. That is, if an escrow supports a rate of tktrate tickets per
round, then in the first round tickets with sequence numbers 0 to tktrate-1 may
be issued. Then, in the second round tickets with sequence number range tktrate
to 2tktrate-1 can be issued, and so on until the last round of an escrow lifetime.
Merchants will accept tickets in the current round with sequence numbers that
follow this assignment schedule. In order to deal with the fact that customers
and merchants may have inconsistent views of the blockchain, and hence, may
not agree about what the current round is (i.e., current height of the blockchain),
merchants will also accept tickets from the prior and next round given that these
tickets use the correct sequence number range.
An example of a ticket issuing schedule is found in Figure 2. As shown, the
escrow creation transaction is published at round 10 and confirmed at round 16.
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Blockchain Block 10 Block 16... Block 17 Block 18 Block 19
1st issue round
issue time = 17
seqno = {0, ..., 999}
escTr Confirmed
Escrow Creation 
Transaction (escTr) 
2nd issue round
issue time = 18
seqno = {1000, ..., 1999}
3rd issue round
issue time = 19
seqno = {2000, ..., 2999}
Fig. 2: An example of a ticket issuing schedule.
This escrow has lesc = 3 rounds, and allows a ticket issue rate of 1000 tickets
per round. Thus, the customer has 3 ticket issuing rounds, starting at round 17,
with the sequence number ranges shown in the figure.
The miners update the escrow state based on the escrow related transac-
tions (mentioned earlier) they process. For example, redeeming a winning ticket
reduces Bescrow by β coins, and receiving a valid proof-of-cheating against the
customer causes the miners to burn the funds in Bpenalty. All these transactions
are logged on the blockchain, which permits anyone to validate the state.
The miners discard an escrow state once all tickets tied to this escrow expire,
which happens at time trefund, or when an escrow is broken after receiving a valid
proof-of-cheating (proof-of-cheating is discussed in Section 4.5). At that time,
the customer may spend the remaining funds of its payment escrow (if any) and
its penalty deposit (if not revoked).
4.2 Paying with Lottery Tickets
After the escrow is confirmed on the blockchain, a customer can start paying for
service by giving merchants lottery tickets. A lottery ticket tktL is a structure
containing several fields as follows:
tktL = indexM ||idesc||seqno||σC (3)
where indexM is the recipient merchant index as listed in the escrow state, idesc
is the escrow ID, seqno is the ticket sequence number, and σC is the customer’s
signature. The seqno field, along with idesc, identifies a ticket, which also pro-
vides means for ticket tracking in the system. Note there is no need to include
any information about the escrow setup or the parties’ public keys in the ticket
itself. Merchants and miners can look these up on the blockchain using idesc.
When issuing a ticket, the customer fills in the above fields and signs the ticket
using the secret key tied to the public key the customer used when creating the
escrow. The ticket seqno can be any sequence number within the range assigned
to the current ticket issue round. The customer can continue issuing lottery
tickets, without waiting the lottery results of previously issued ones, until it
finishes all sequence numbers in this range. After that, it must wait the next
round to generate more tickets.
Upon receiving a ticket, a merchant verifies it as follows:
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Blockchain Block 40... ...Block 30Block 28 Block 29...
Fig. 3: An example of lottery draw time (drawlen = 3, p = 1/300, tktrate = 1000,
and ddraw = 10).
– Check that the escrow is not broken
– Check that its index indexM , that appears in the ticket, is identical to the
one listed in the escrow state.
– Verify that seqno is within the valid range based on the ticket issuing sched-
ule. (As mentioned before, to handle inconsistencies in the blockchain view,
tickets from the previous or next issuance round can be accepted.)
– Verify σC over the ticket using the customer’s public key.
If any of the above checks fails (except the fourth one), the merchant drops
the ticket. On the other hand, if the ticket has an out-of-range sequence number
(i.e., larger than the maximum sequence number allowed by the escrow), the
recipient merchant can issue a proof-of-cheating that will cost the customer its
penalty deposit. Otherwise, if all the above checks pass, the merchant accepts
the ticket and keeps it until its lottery draw time.
4.3 The Lottery Protocol
MicroCash introduces a lightweight lottery protocol that relies solely on secure
hashing. This protocol does not require any interaction between the customer
and the merchant. Instead, it utilizes only the state of the blockchain, where the
lottery draw outcome is determined by a value derived from the block mined at
the lottery draw time.
To specify the lottery draw time, MicroCash defines two system parameters,
ddraw and drawlen mentioned earlier. ddraw represents the least number of rounds
a ticket has to wait after its issue round (which we call tissue) until it enters the
lottery. drawlen determines the number of consecutive ticket issuing rounds that
will have all their lottery tickets enter the same lottery draw5. Hence, if drawlen
= 1, then the draw time tdraw of a ticket is computed as tdraw = tissue + ddraw.
On the other hand, if drawlen > 1, then tdraw of a ticket is tdraw of the last ticket
issuing round in the contiguous set of rounds.
A clarifying example of determining the lottery draw time is found in Fig-
ure 3. As shown, starting with the first ticket issuing round, which is 28 in the
figure, each set of contiguous drawlen rounds enter the lottery together. For ex-
ample, all tickets issued in rounds 28, 29, and 30 enter the lottery at round 40,
which is 10 rounds after the last ticket issue round in this set.
5 Since drawlen affects tdraw of a ticket, MicroCash specifies a small interval for its
possible values to prevent a customer from excessively delaying paying merchants.
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Accordingly, whether a ticket wins or loses depends on a lottery draw value
tied to the block mined at time tdraw. This value is computed using a simple
verifiable delay function (VDF) [24] that is evaluated over this block. This eval-
uation takes a period of time, hence the name delay function, where this period
is a system parameter. Consequently, when a miner mines the block at index
tdraw, it cannot tell immediately which ticket will win or lose. This miner first
has to compute the VDF over this block.
We instantiate this VDF using iterative hashing, where the number of itera-
tions is set to a value that delays producing the output by the period specified
in the system. In addition, we let the miners compute this function as part of
the mining process. That is, when a miner mines a new block, it evaluates the
VDF over the previous block. Therefore, the VDF value of the block at index
tdraw appears on the blockchain when the block at index tdraw + 1 is mined.
Accordingly, in our protocol a merchant keeps a ticket tktL until its lottery
draw time tdraw. Then, after observing the VDF value of the block mined at that
time, the miners, and any party in the system, can compute the set of winning
sequence numbers for that round as follows. First, the hash of the VDF value
along with the escrow ID is computed, which we call h1, and then h1 is mapped
to a sequence number within the assigned range of the ticket issuing rounds tied
to tdraw. To obtain the second winning ticket sequence number, the hash of h1 is
computed to obtain h2, and then h2 is mapped to a ticket sequence number in
the given range. If a collision occurs, i.e., a previously seen sequence number is
produced, it is discarded and the process proceeds with hashing h2 to obtain h3,
and so on. This continues until a set of distinct ptktrate drawlen winning sequence
numbers is drawn6.
The previous process is clarified by the example depicted in Figure 4, which
has the same setup as in Figure 3. As shown, and assuming that round 28 is
the first ticket issuing round, the ticket has been issued at round 29, and hence,
it entered the lottery at round 40. The VDF value of the block with index 40
appears inside block 41. By using this value, a set of winning sequence numbers
is chosen, based on which the ticket in the figure is a winning one because its
sequence number is within this set.
Note that the lottery draw involves only values that are part of the escrow
state. In other words, it relies on parameters that the issuing customer cannot
manipulate, which do not include the merchant recipient address. This means
that a ticket’s chance of winning the lottery is not affected by who owns it. In
addition, this means that if a customer issues tickets with duplicated sequence
numbers to multiple merchants, all these tickets will win or lose together. If the
tickets win, detecting cheating is trivial because both merchants will publish
their winning tickets to the blockchain to redeem the tickets.
6 We design a version of this lottery protocol with independent ticket winning events
in Appendix A. This version can be used in case it is infeasible in some applications
to configure ptktrate drawlen to be an integer.
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Block 41
tktL is a winning ticket
Blockchain Block 30 Block 40... ...Block 28 Block 29
Winning Set 
of Tickets
...
Fig. 4: Lottery draw example (same setup as in Figure 3).
4.4 Claiming Winning Tickets
After the lottery draw, a merchant can collect currency from the customer’s
escrow by redeeming its winning tickets (if any). This is done by issuing a redeem
transaction that has the winning ticket as input, and has β coins directed to the
merchant’s address as output.
To allow the miners to resolve tickets and release escrow funds back to the
customer in a reasonable timeframe, MicroCash specifies a redeem period for each
ticket. This is done by defining a system parameter called dredeem that determines
the number of rounds during which a ticket can be redeemed. After this period,
a ticket expires, which happens at time texpire = tdraw + dredeem. Thus, dredeem
must be set to a value that allows merchants to redeem their winning tickets.
After receiving a redeem transaction, the miners process it as follows:
– Check that the format of the transaction complies with the system specifi-
cations.
– Verify the redeemed ticket as outlined in Section 4.2.
– Verify that the ticket is a winning one by checking that its sequence number
is among the winning set tied to time tdraw of this ticket.
– Check that the ticket is not expired.
– Verify the merchant’s signature over the redeem transaction using the public
key corresponding to indexM found in the escrow state. This is needed to
prevent participants from redeeming tickets they do not own.
– Check that no other ticket with the same sequence number and tied to the
same escrow has already been redeemed. If it is, this is a proof of duplicate
ticket issuance and is used as a proof-of-cheating against the customer.
If all these checks pass, miners approve the redeem transaction and update
the escrow state accordingly. Otherwise, they drop an invalid transaction and,
if a proof-of-cheating is produced, revoke the customer’s penalty deposit.
4.5 Processing Proof-of-cheating
A proof-of-cheating is a special transaction that can be presented to the miners
by any party who witnesses a cheating incident. In MicroCash, such an incident
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could be issuing more tickets than what an escrow can cover, i.e., exceed the max-
imum seqno an escrow may allow, or duplicate ticket issuance. A signed lottery
ticket with an out-of-range sequence number or signed tickets with duplicated
sequence numbers are publicly verifiable proofs against the issuing customer.
Upon verifying cheating, miners punish the customer by revoking the penalty
escrow tied to its payment escrow referenced in the ticket as follows. In case of
duplicate ticket issuance, the miners first pay all duplicated winning tickets from
the payment escrow, if it is sufficient, and from the penalty deposit thereafter.
Then, they publish an escrow break transaction containing the proof-of-cheating
on the blockchain. This transaction burns the revoked penalty deposit rather
than providing them to another party. This is done to mitigate the case that
if the funds are provided to another party, that party may have colluded with
the customer to receive those funds. Respecting the lower bound of Bpenalty, as
specified by equation 2, ensures that all the aforementioned cheating behaviors
are less profitable than acting in an honest way. Hence, it makes such behaviors
unappealing to rational customers.
5 Computing a Lower Bound for Bpenalty
In this section, we compute a lower bound for the penalty deposit Bpenalty re-
quired to deter cheating. This is done using a game theoretic approach that
quantifies the additional utility gain, or monetary profit, a malicious customer
could accrue as compared to an honest one. By setting the penalty deposit to at
least equal this additional utility, cheating becomes less profitable in expectation
than acting honestly, and hence, becomes less unappealing to rational customers.
In what follows, we present this analysis including the malicious strategies
addressed, the game setup, and a definition for the utility gain function. Finally,
we state and prove a lower bound for Bpenalty.
Covered malicious strategies. In MicroCash, a penalty escrow is revoked
upon the detection of two types of malicious events: issuing duplicated tickets
or issuing invalid payments. The utility gain of any of these malicious strategies
depends on the length of the cheating detection period, i.e., the time needed
to detect a cheating incident. Throughout this period, the cheating customer is
still perceived as honest by merchants, and so can continue cheat and increase
its utility gain. Consequently, the longer the detection period lasts, the greater
the accumulated additional utility.
Given that merchants verify each ticket immediately when received, invalid
payments are detected instantly. On the other hand, duplicated tickets are not
detected until they are redeemed (if they win the lottery), which may happen
after several rounds in MicroCash. This means that the additional utility gain of
ticket duplication will be larger than one obtained by issuing invalid payments.
Therefore, setting the value of the penalty deposit based on the additional utility
gain of the former covers the latter as well. For this reason, we consider only
ticket duplication strategy in our analysis.
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Game setup. We posit a single player game in which a malicious customer
applies the ticket duplication strategy. This strategy is defined as duplicating a
sequence number among two or more tickets, up to m tickets, where m is the
number of beneficiary merchants of an escrow.
Based on the design of MicroCash’s lottery protocol, these duplicated tick-
ets will either all win the lottery or all lose because the lottery draw does not
depend on the ticket recipient address (see Section 4.3). This means that dupli-
cation among fewer than m merchants does not reduce the cheating detection
probability. Therefore, a rational customer who decides to duplicate a specific
ticket will always duplicate it among all m merchants.
Moreover, under the fixed winning rate approach, a rational customer will not
duplicate more than (1−p)tktrate sequence numbers. This is because a number of
ptktrate winning tickets (or sequence numbers) will be selected at each round, and
the rest of the tickets, i.e., (1− p)tktrate tickets, will not win. Thus, duplicating
more than (1 − p)tktrate sequence numbers guarantees that a duplicated ticket
will win. Exceeding this number means that the cheating detection probability
will be 1.
As mentioned previously, MicroCash requires any customer to specify the set
of merchants who are beneficiaries of its escrow in advance. This is needed to be
able to bound the additional utility gain of malicious customers [25]. If this set
is not specified, the additional utility cannot be bounded because we would not
know the maximum number of duplicated tickets that could be issued.
Since MicroCash adds the parameter drawlen that groups several rounds to-
gether when entering the lottery, we refer to a list of contiguous drawlen rounds
as a lottery round. Hence, the number of lottery rounds in an escrow lifetime
is lescdrawlen , and in each lottery round a customer can issue up to drawlen tktrate
tickets7. Based on these variables, the cheating detection period of all duplicated
tickets issued in any lottery round in MicroCash is ddraw + dredeem rounds (the
latter is in terms of simple rounds, where a round is the time needed to mine a
block on the blockchain). That is, a malicious customer will be detected when
any of the duplicated tickets is presented to the miners8. This happens if dupli-
cated tickets win the lottery and are then claimed by the merchants. Considering
the worst case that this claim may take place in the last round of the redeem
period, cheating will be detected after ddraw + dredeem rounds from a ticket issue
time. At that time, the miners revoke the penalty escrow and the cheating cus-
tomer leaves the system. Otherwise, if none of the duplicated tickets win, this
customer stays and may continue cheating. To simplify the analysis, we will use
lottery rounds to express the cheating detection period. That is, this period is
expressed as (ddraw + dredeem)/drawlen lottery rounds. To ease the discussion,
we use round to refer to a lottery round in the rest of this section.
7 In case of a non-integer number of lottery rounds, we take the ceiling. This makes
our bound more conservative, and hence, provides stronger motivation for acting
honestly.
8 We do not assume that merchants exchange any information about tickets they
received.
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Table 1: Notations I.
Symbol Meaning
C Honest customer.
Cˆ Malicious customer.
u(·) Utility gain function.
τ The number of tickets that can be issued per lottery round, such that
τ =drawlen tktrate and τ ∈ N.
d The lottery draw period measured in lottery rounds, such that d =
ddraw
drawlen
and d ∈ N.
r The ticket redemption period measured in lottery rounds, such that
r = dredeem
drawlen
and r ∈ N.
yi Number of duplicated tickets in a lottery round i, such that 0 ≤ yi ≤
(1− p)τ .
m Number of beneficiary merchants, such that m ∈ N.
p Lottery winning probability, such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
β Currency value of a winning ticket, such that β ∈ R+.
k The escrow lifetime measured in lottery rounds, such that k = lesc
drawlen
and k ∈ N.
Table 1 summarizes the notations we use in this section, including shorter
abbreviations than those used earlier in this paper to simplify presentation.
Utility gain function definition. We define the utility gain function of any
customer as the service value minus the payments made to merchants. We com-
pute the expected value of this function for an honest customer and for a ma-
licious one that uses the ticket duplication strategy. In order to deter cheating,
we require the latter to be less than or equal to the former. This is achieved
by setting the penalty deposit to be at least equal to the maximum additional
expected utility gained by cheating.
Additional utility gain analysis. We now state and prove a lower bound for
Bpenalty based on the above game setup.
Theorem 1. For the game and escrow setup described above, issuing invalid or
duplicated lottery tickets is less profitable in expectation than acting in an honest
way if:
Bpenalty > (m− 1)pβτ
(
1− p
1− 1
τC(1−p)τ
+ (1− p)(d− 1) + r
)
(4)
Proof. In MicroCash, a customer can create an escrow with a k round lifetime.
All tickets issued in a round enter the lottery after d rounds, and all winning
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tickets will expire after r rounds from the lottery draw time. In other words, for
each round i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, all tickets issued in round i will enter the lottery at
round i+ d and will expire at round i+ d+ r.
During each round of an escrow lifetime, an honest customer can issue up
to τ tickets with unique sequence numbers. Each ticket has an expected value
of pβ coins, which corresponds to the service value a customer obtains from a
merchant for handing out this ticket. We use this service value in computing the
utility gain function, and hence, deriving a lower bound for Bpenalty.
In contrast, when applying the duplicated ticket issuance strategy, for each
round i ∈ {1, . . . , k} a malicious customer would decide to duplicate yi tickets,
where yi ∈ {1, . . . , (1 − p)τ}. If none of the duplicated tickets win, which hap-
pens with probability (1−p)τ
Cyi
τCyi
,9 the customer stays in the system and obtains
an additional utility gain of (m − 1)pβyi over what an honest customer would
receive. This occurs because an honest customer will use a sequence number
with one merchant only. The malicious customer uses a sequence number with
m merchants, and hence, it obtains service from an additional m− 1 merchants
by duplicating a sequence number.
On the other hand, if any of the duplicated tickets wins the lottery at round
i+ d, which happens with probability 1− (1−p)τCyi
τCyi
, the malicious customer will
be detected at round i+ d+ r (the latest). This reduces its additional utility by
Bpenalty since the penalty escrow will be revoked by the miners.
Note that when a duplicated ticket wins, meaning that cheating will be de-
tected, the malicious customer will still have r rounds to issue tickets. Therefore,
as a rational behavior, this customer will choose to duplicate all tickets in these
rounds because it must leave the system either way.
In order to compute the additional utility gain, we need to model the dupli-
cation decisions a malicious customer would make at each round of an escrow
lifetime. We use a decision process diagram that captures a process evolution over
time. Such a diagram contains states indicating the rounds, transition probabil-
ities between these states computed based on the decisions made at each state,
and the additional utility of being at each state, or round, in the system.
To clarify this concept, we consider a simple case where we have an escrow
with 3 round lifetime, d = 2 rounds, and r = 1 round. The decision process
for this setup is captured in Figure 5. As shown, a customer issues tickets for
rounds 1 and 2 before any lottery draw takes place, in which it duplicates y1
and y2 tickets, respectively. All tickets issued during round 1 enter the lottery at
the beginning of round 3 (or immediately after the end of round 2 as depicted
in the figure). If none of these tickets win, the malicious customer obtains an
additional utility gain of (m− 1)pβy1 and proceeds to round 3. For this round,
the customer decides to duplicate y3 tickets. On the other hand, if any of the y1
tickets wins, the customer knows that it will be detected at the end of round 3
(since r = 1). Thus, it decides to duplicate all tickets in round 3 (i.e., y3 = τ).
The total additional utility the customer obtains in this case, which is displayed
9 The expression aCb stands for
(
a
b
)
.
16
Exit Exit Exit
Exit
Fig. 5: Decision process for a 3 round escrow with d = 2 rounds and r = 1 round.
Arrows carry probabilities, decisions are found below the states, and the utility
gain is found above the states.
above the exit state since this customer will leave the system, is the sum of the
utility gain of duplicating y1, y2, and y3 tickets, where y3 = τ , minus the penalty
deposit that will be revoked.
The same analogy is applied to the rest of the rounds, with the exception
that at the very last rounds there are less than r rounds that can be used at the
exit state. In other words, the number of remaining rounds in the escrow lifetime
could be less than r, and hence, a customer will duplicate fewer than rτ tickets.
This is illustrated in the exit state after round i = 3 in Figure 5.
Instead of analyzing a decision process for a k round escrow directly, we
formulate the expected utility gain of a malicious customer in a recursive way.
That is, we use the expected utility gain in a k − 1 round escrow to compute
the expected utility gain in a k round escrow, and so on. Intuitively, during the
first round of a k round escrow, a malicious customer will decide to duplicate
y1 tickets. If any of these tickets wins at round 1 + d, cheating will be detected.
In this case, and as mentioned earlier, the customer will duplicate all tickets
for the next r rounds and will pay the penalty Bpenalty. This means that with
probability 1− (1−p)τCyi
τCy1
, the utility gain is (m− 1)pβ(∑di=1 y1 + rτ)−Bpenalty.
If none of the y1 tickets wins the lottery, the customer stays in the system.
In this case, round 2 offers a fresh start in a k − 1 round escrow. That is, after
collecting the utility gain of duplicating y1 tickets, the customer is just like
starting fresh in a one round shorter escrow. This means that with probability
(1−p)τCy1
τCy1
, the utility gain will be (m − 1)pβy1 + Ek−1[u(Cˆ)], where the second
term denotes the expected utility gain of a malicious customer in a k − 1 round
escrow.
Based on the above, we can express Ek[u(Cˆ)], which is the quantity of interest,
as follows:
Ek[u(Cˆ)] =
(
1− (1−p)τCy1
τCy1
)(
(m− 1)pβ
d∑
i=1
yi + (m− 1)pβrτ −Bpenalty
)
+(
(1−p)τCy1
τCy1
)(
(m− 1)pβy1 + Ek−1[u(Cˆ)]
)
(5)
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But we have Ek−1[u(Cˆ)] < 0 since the penalty for a k − 1 round escrow has
been configured in a way that makes Ek−1[u(Cˆ)] < 0 in order to deter cheating.
Hence, and by requiring Ek[u(Cˆ)] ≤ 0 to make cheating unprofitable, we find
that:
Bpenalty(y1, . . . , yd) > (m− 1)pβ
(
y1
1− (1−p)τCy1
τCy1
+
d∑
i=2
yi + rτ
)
(6)
For any d and r value, the above quantity is maximized when yi = (1− p)τ
for i ∈ {1, . . . , d}.10 Substituting these in equation 6 produces the lower bound
stated in the theorem, which completes the proof.11 uunionsq
As an example, consider an escrow with a 200 round lifetime, τ = 1000
tickets, p = 0.01, β = 1 coin, m = 5, d = 6, r = 6, and drawlen = 1. Applying
equation 1 produces Bescrow = 2, 000 coins, and applying equation 4 produces
Bpenalty > 477.6 coins.
6 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the resilience of MicroCash to the threats outlined in
Section 3. To defend against these threats, our scheme utilizes cryptographic and
financial techniques based on the threat type to be addressed. This is discussed
in the following paragraphs.
Escrow overdraft. This threat can be exploited using several strategies, in-
cluding:
– A customer creates a payment escrow with a balance that cannot cover all
winning tickets, or a penalty escrow with a balance that cannot cover the
financial punishment.
– A customer issues more tickets than the tktrate specified in its escrow setup.
– A customer performs a front running attack in which it withdraws the pay-
ment escrow before paying merchants, or withdraws the penalty escrow be-
fore paying the financial punishment when caught cheating.
The first strategy, in which a customer creates payment and penalty escrows
with insufficient balances, is neutralized by the escrow setup of MicroCash. When
processing an escrow creation transaction, the miners check that the payment
escrow balance covers all winning tickets (see Section 4.1). In addition, they
10 This is done by considering the terms in equation 6. For the first term, we used a
simple iterative program to compute the value of y1 that maximizes this term for
p ∈ [0.000001, 0.999999], with an increment step of 0.000001, and τ ≤ 106. We found
that y1 = (1 − p)τ for all these p values. The second term is maximized when yi is
set to its maximum value, which is (1− p)τ , for all i ∈ {2, . . . , d}.
11 Equation 4 in Theorem 1 is reported in Section 4 as equation 2 after converting the
lottery rounds into simple rounds using the original notations found in that section.
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check that the penalty deposit meets the lower bound derived in Section 5. The
miners will reject any escrow that does not satisfy these conditions.
The second strategy, i.e., issuing more tickets than can be covered by the
escrow, cannot be performed because lottery tickets are tracked using their se-
quence numbers. When receiving a ticket, a merchant checks that a sequence
number to be within the range assigned to a ticket issue round before accepting
the ticket. Hence, if a customer exceeds tktrate in any round, merchants will
detect that immediately. Merchants will reject any ticket outside of the current
round (modulo one round to deal with desynchronized views of the blockchain).
As for the last strategy that covers front running attacks, such attacks are
mitigated by the escrow spending mechanism and the lottery protocol imple-
mented in MicroCash. A customer does not control any of the escrows it owns.
Instead, fund release is triggered only by the receipt of a valid winning lottery
ticket, in the case of a payment escrow, or a valid proof-of-cheating, in the case
of a penalty escrow. Honest miners will enforce these rules in the system.
Duplicate Ticket Issuance. MicroCash addresses this attack financially through
a detect-and-punish approach. Any party that detects two or more tickets issued
using the same escrow and carrying identical sequence numbers can produce a
proof-of-cheating against the issuing customer. Miners publish this proof on the
blockchain, which burns the customers penalty escrow as a punishment. Setting
the penalty deposit as described in Appendix 5 makes cheating unprofitable,
which deters rational customers from attempting this malicious strategy.
Invalid payments. To pursue this attack, a customer may issue tickets with in-
valid format or invalid field values knowing that these tickets cannot be claimed
later if they win. An invalid ticket is one that uses an invalid escrow (e.g., a
broken one), has an invalid (tissue, seqno) tuple, or contains a merchant index
that is not listed in the escrow state. These events can be detected instantly be-
cause merchants validate all lottery tickets before accepting them. As mentioned
previously, an invalid ticket is dropped unless it has an invalid (tissue, seqno) tu-
ple. As such a ticket can be used as a proof-of-cheating, the customer loses the
penalty escrow, which exceeds any profit from cheating. This discourages ratio-
nal customers from issuing invalid tickets.
Unused-escrow withholding. This threat is mitigated by the expiration rule
of lottery tickets and MicroCash’s escrow refund policy. Each ticket has a set
redemption period after which it expires. Hence, a merchant who tries to put
an escrow on hold by delaying a winning ticket claim will lose its payment.
Furthermore, when all tickets tied to an escrow expire, i.e., when trefund is ap-
proached, the miners will allow the customer to spend the remaining funds in its
escrow. This prevents locking unused escrow funds indefinitely on the blockchain.
DoS. As DoS is a large threat category, in this work we consider only the cases
that are unique to the design of MicroCash. These include preventing customers
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from creating escrows, preventing merchants from claiming their winning lot-
tery tickets, or controlling relaying blocks and transactions based on their con-
tent. Such situations may happen when miners disregard specific transactions
or blocks, or when an attacker controls the network links and drops specific
transactions or blocks.
The case of miners disregarding specific transactions/blocks may take place
when an attacker controls a substantial portion of the mining power. This may
work even under the assumption that the majority of the mining power is honest.
That is, an attacker with < 50% of the mining power may still be able to perform
harmful attacks, e.g., selfish mining [37]. To protect against selective relaying,
techniques that allow propagating blocks and transactions without disclosing
their content can be employed, e.g., BloXroute [8].
The case of controlling the network links, which represents attacks against
network availability, is a potential problem in any distributed system. Deploying
mechanisms to enhance network connectivity, such as participants maintaining
connections with large number of miners, may reduce the impact of this attack.
Such mechanisms are independent of the design of MicroCash, and so it is up to
the parties themselves to adopt suitable solutions.
Lottery manipulation. This threat covers all strategies that could be used to
manipulate the lottery draw, including:
– An attacker, who could be any party inside or outside the system, tries to
influence the hash used in a lottery draw in order to make specific tickets
win or lose.
– A malicious customer may issue winning lottery tickets, to itself or to ma-
licious colluding merchants, to drain the escrow before other merchants can
claim their winning tickets.
– A malicious customer deliberately issues losing tickets to merchants to avoid
paying them.
– An attacker, insider or outsider, tries to issue lottery tickets to herself or
others.
In the first strategy, an attacker tries to influence the lottery by controlling
the hash used in the lottery draw. This can be done by either manipulating the
ticket fields that impact the lottery, or by controlling the hash of the block mined
at time tdraw. In the former, the issuing customer may tweak a ticket in order to
influence its chance of winning the lottery. In the latter, a miner may forgo any
block that does not produce a favorable lottery outcome (i.e., a favorable VDF
value), or even publish an incorrect VDF value in order to bias the lottery draw
outcome.
All these malicious behaviors are mitigated by the lottery protocol design.
The ticket fields that impact the lottery draw include only the ones that appear
in the escrow state, and these cannot be tweaked by the issuing customer, or
by any other party. As for discarding unfavorable blocks, recall that the lottery
draw is based on the VDF value of the block at index tdraw. Therefore, a miner
who chooses to perform this computation and then announce a favorable block,
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is not likely to succeed in publishing this block on the blockchain. Computing the
VDF takes time, and in the meantime other miners will announce their blocks
immediately. These blocks are more likely to be adopted by the network, and
hence, to be used in the lottery draw (under the assumption that the majority
of the mining power is honest). Furthermore, publishing an invalid VDF value
will not succeed because honest miners, who already computed this value while
mining their blocks, will reject a newly received block with a VDF value that
does not match their own. Consequently, such a malicious miner will not only
fail in biasing the lottery, but also will lose the mining rewards.
In the second strategy, a malicious customer tries to withdraw an escrow
indirectly by issuing winning tickets to itself, and claiming these tickets before
merchants can claim their payments. To do so, a customer may wait until the
block at index tdraw is mined and then print winning tickets to itself. This tech-
nique is mitigated by the lottery protocol design. As the ticket issue schedule
specifies both issue and lottery draw time for each round, it will be too late for
the customer to select winning sequence numbers after tdraw. After observing
the block at time tdraw, this customer cannot do anything to produce winning
tickets other than checking which sequence numbers are winning (assuming it
did not use these sequence numbers to pay any merchant earlier). As mentioned
previously, this customer cannot manipulate the ticket fields to make a losing
sequence number win. Also, it cannot issue losing tickets using these sequence
numbers to merchants because the issue time of these tickets was at least ddraw
rounds earlier, and hence, merchants will not accept these tickets that lost the
lottery. On the other hand, should a customer who saves some sequence numbers
and uses them to issue tickets to itself have winning tickets, it will not affect
the payments of other merchants. Such sequence numbers represent legitimate
tickets and are therefore are covered by the payment escrow balance.
The third strategy, where a customer deliberately hands merchants losing
tickets, will fail with overwhelming probability. In order to determine which
ticket will lose the lottery, the customer needs to either predict the hash of the
future block mined at time tdraw in order to compute its VDF value, or take
a guess at the VDF value itself. Since hash functions are modeled as random
oracles, predicting such values succeeds with negligible probability.
Lastly, the fourth strategy, in which an attacker tries to issue tickets tied
to escrows she does not own, will not succeed due to the system’s use of secure
cryptographic signatures. MicroCash requires customers to sign all lottery tickets
they issue, which means that to issue a valid ticket an attacker needs to forge the
customers signature. By using a secure digital signature scheme such an attack
will fail with overwhelming probability.
7 Performance Evaluation
In order to understand the performance benefit of concurrent probabilistic mi-
cropayments, this section evaluates the computation, bandwidth, and payment
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setup costs of MicroCash. To do this, we conduct empirical experiments to answer
the following questions:
– How fast can customers, merchants, and miners process lottery tickets?
– What is the bandwidth cost of exchanging these tickets?
– What is the size of escrows on the blockchain?
– How do the schemes compare using workload numbers derived from real
world scenarios?
To put our results in context, we compare our scheme with MICROPAY [33].
The rest of this section describes our methodology and discusses the significance
of the obtained results.
7.1 Methodology
To establish our benchmarks, we implemented the functions used for generating
tickets, verifying these ticket, and performing a lottery draw. For MicroCash,
we followed the design introduced in this paper. For MICROPAY, we tested its
fully decentralized version, called MICROPAY1, with its non-interactive lottery
protocol as outlined in [33]. This protocol requires a merchant to publish the
description of a verifiable unpredictable function to perform the lottery. For this
function, we used the verifiable random function (VRF) construction introduced
by Goldberg et al. [27] with its implementation over the NIST P-256 curve [16].
Two cryptographic primitives affect the implementation of both MicroCash
and MICROPAY, namely, hash functions and digital signatures. For hashing,
we used SHA256. For digital signatures, we chose to test the most common
elliptic curve based constructions. These include ECDSA with secp256k1 curve
(used in Bitcoin and most cryptocurrencies), ECDSA with P-256 curve (widely
used and recommended by NIST), and EdDSA with Ed25519 curve [23] (of
a great interest recently as its security and efficiency have encouraged several
major cryptocurrencies to either use this scheme [18,15] or prepare to switch to
it [17,11]).
We computed the performance metrics of interest as follows. The computa-
tion cost was measured as the rate at which customers, merchants, and miners
can process lottery tickets. Bandwidth overhead was calculated by reporting on
the size of tickets (in bytes) when exchanged between customers and merchants,
and when claimed through the miners. To evaluate the effect of micropayment
concurrency, we computed the number of escrows a customer would need to sup-
port the ticket issue rate in each of the tested schemes. Lastly, we studied two
real life applications and computed the overhead of processing micropayments
using workload numbers derived from these applications.
Our experiments were implemented in C on an Intel Core i7-4600U CPU @
2.1 GHz, with 4 MB cache and 8 GB RAM, where each of the payment processing
functions was called 106 times.
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Table 2: Ticket processing rate (ticket / sec).
MICROPAY MicroCash
ECDSA
(secp256k1)
ECDSA
(P-256)
EdDSA
(Ed25519)
ECDSA
(secp256k1)
ECDSA
(P-256)
EdDSA
(Ed25519)
Customer 1,859 32,471 26,238 1,868 33,006 26,749
Merchant 1,328 2,399 2,561 2,249 10,505 8,473
Miner 1,340 2,448 2,617 2,241 10,345 8,368
7.2 Microbenchmark Results
Lottery ticket processing rate We start by quantifying the computation
cost of processing micropayments in both schemes. This is done by measuring
the rate at which a customer can generate lottery tickets, the rate at which a
merchant can process these tickets, which involves both validating a ticket and
running the lottery12, and the rate at which miners validate claimed tickets and
running the lottery for the escrows. The obtained results are found in Table 2.
As the table shows, customers in both schemes generate tickets at comparable
rates because the operations performed are almost identical in MicroCash and
MICROPAY. Given that the heaviest operation in this process is signing a ticket,
the generation rates improve by using an efficient digital signature scheme (when
replacing ECDSA (secp256k1) with ECDSA (P-256) and EdDSA (Ed25519),
performance is boosted by around 17x and 14x, respectively).
The trend is different for the rates of merchants and miners. These parties in
MicroCash are 1.7x, 4.2x, and 3.2x faster than in MICROPAY for the three digital
signature schemes. This is because miners and merchants run and verify the
lottery draw outcome. In MicroCash, this process involves only lightweight hash
operations. On the other hand, the lottery in MICROPAY requires evaluating,
and proving the output correctness, of a computationally-heavy VRF.
Furthermore, merchants and miners in MicroCash benefit more from the ef-
ficiency of the used digital signature scheme. This is because the heaviest oper-
ation these parties perform when processing a ticket in MicroCash is verifying
a customer’s signature. However, in MICROPAY the bottleneck is evaluating
a VRF and producing a proof that its output is correct on the merchant side,
and verifying this proof on the miner side. As shown in the table, MICROPAY
obtains only around 1.9x improvement when replacing ECDSA (secp256k1) with
any of the other two schemes. In contrast, MicroCash achieves around 4.7x and
3.8x improvement when replacing ECDSA (secp256k1) with ECDSA (P-256) or
EdDSA (Ed25519), respectively.
Key Takeaway: Compared to MICROPAY, MicroCash reduces the compu-
tational load on merchants and miners by a factor of 1.7-4.2x.
12 Although a merchant in MicroCash runs the lottery several rounds after validating
a ticket, we report the cost of these two operations together. This is because such
cost is the overhead per ticket incurred on the merchant side.
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Lottery ticket bandwidth cost In terms of bandwidth, MicroCash incurs less
overhead than MICROPAY because its lottery tickets are smaller. A ticket sent
from a customer to a merchant is 110 bytes in MicroCash, while it is 274 bytes in
MICROPAY. A winning ticket sent from merchants to miners is also 110 bytes
in MicroCash, while it is 355 bytes for MICROPAY because this ticket must be
accompanied with a NIZK proof. This means that MicroCash incurs only 40% of
the bandwidth overhead of MICROPAY between customers and merchants, and
only 31% of the overhead between merchants and miners.
To put these numbers in context, we report on the transaction sizes in Bitcoin.
The average size is around 500 bytes, where a transaction with one or two inputs
is about 250 bytes [20]. Adding a winning ticket as one of these inputs produces
a claim transaction with a size of 360 bytes in MicroCash, which is less than the
average Bitcoin transaction size. On the other hand, in MICROPAY the size of
a claim transaction will be 605 bytes, exceeding the average size.
Key Takeaway: The use of efficient lottery protocol reduces not only the
computation cost in MicroCash, but also the bandwidth cost of exchanging lot-
tery tickets and the amount of data to be logged on the blockchain.
Size of escrows on the blockchain One major difference between concurrent
and sequential micropayment schemes is that the former need a new escrow
after each winning ticket. Additionally, to issue tickets in parallel at a fast rate
in sequential schemes, the customer needs a large number of escrows. This is
because a new ticket cannot be issued using the same escrow until it is confirmed
that the prior ticket did not win, which requires the customer to wait for the
merchant to announce the lottery result. Hence, even if the customer is capable of
generating tickets at a fast rate, it might slow down just because it does not have
enough escrows to allow this rate. Furthermore, even if the customer is willing
to create larger number of escrows, this dramatically increases the overhead.
Each of these escrows requires an individual escrow creation transaction, which
in turn requires paying a transaction fee and logging on the blockchain.
For example, to support the ticket issue rates reported in Table 2, a MI-
CROPAY customer would need a large number of escrows. The exact number
of escrows needed depends on the network latency and a merchant’s ticket pro-
cessing rate. Using the average US RTT of 31 ms [2], and the processing time
of the tickets, in the best case an escrow in MICROPAY can be used to issue
32 tickets per second (this is in case none of these ticket win or only the last
one wins). Therefore, a customer in MICROPAY would need 60, 1019, or 653 es-
crows per second to support the generation rates for signature schemes ECDSA
(secp256k1), ECDSA (P-256), or EdDSA (Ed25519), respectively, as found in
Table 2. On the other hand, a customer in MicroCash would need only one es-
crow with the proper balance to pay at any given ticket rate. As such, MicroCash
dramatically reduces the amount of data logged on the blockchain.
Key Takeaway: Supporting micropayment concurrency dramatically re-
duces the amount of escrow data on the blockchain.
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7.3 Micropayments in Real World Applications
To ground our results in real world numbers, we examined two micropayment
applications: online gaming and peer-assisted content delivery networks (CDNs).
We computed the overhead of processing micropayments with parameter values
derived based on the service price and workload in these applications. This is
done for three cases: Bitcoin without employing any micropayment scheme, Bit-
coin with MICROPAY, and Bitcoin with MicroCash.
Setup To compute the overhead, we estimated the service costs and loads from
real world sources. For online gaming, we used data from the popular game
Minecraft [14] as an example. The average mid tier cost of playing this game for
8 players is around $12 per month [12]. We considered 1000 players distributed
among 125 servers. This means that the service price is $0.034722 per minute
(or $0.000579 per second) for the 1000 players.
For the peer-assisted CDN application, we considered a content publisher
that hires peers as caches to distribute the content for its clients. Suppose a
publisher wants to serve content at roughly 1Gpbs. Such a service costs around
$17,312 monthly in the US [1], and hence, on average, the service cost per second
is $0.006679. The publisher will provide a lottery ticket to a cache for each 1MB
data chunk it serves. Thus, to support a rate of 1Gbps, the publisher will issue
128 tickets per second.
With these combined values, it is possible to compute the lottery winning
probability p and the currency value of a winning ticket β. The former is done
by determining the total transaction fee to be paid for the miners (per second),
and then computing p in a way that ensures the fees paid when claiming winning
tickets (per second) do not exceed this value. We consider the fee to be 2% of
the service cost paid per second [3] (at a minimum)13. For the fee of redeeming
a winning ticket, we use the median transaction fee in Bitcoin, which is around
$0.068 as of late January 2019 [5].
Based on the above, the fees per second are equal to the expected number
of winning tickets per second multiplied by the transaction fee that the miners
charge. So in Minecraft, p can be computed as p = (0.02)(0.000579)(16.67)(0.068) = 0.00001,
where 16.67 is the number of tickets issued by all players per second (the 1000
players issue 1000 tickets per minute). Similarly, a publisher in our CDN example
can compute p as p = (0.02)(0.006679)(128)(0.068) = 0.000015.
As for computing β, it can be estimated by dividing the service cost by
the number of winning tickets (both per second). In Minecraft, this produces
β = $3.472, and it is $3.4 in the CDN application.
For the escrow setup, in Minecraft, we assume that each player creates one
escrow per month. For the CDN application, we consider a publisher creating
13 In both examples, we assume that the players and the publisher will pay at the same
price offered by a gaming or CDN company.
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Table 3: Micropayment overhead in online gaming (a round is 10 min).
Metric Bitcoin MICROPAY MicroCash
Winning tickets / sec N/A 0.000167 0.000167
Escrows / sec N/A 0.000552 0.000386
Transactions /sec 16.67 0.000719 0.000552
Transaction fees / round $680 $0.029341 $0.022541
Bandwidth between customers and
miners
3,333 bps 1.105 bps 1.009 bps
Bandwidth between customers and
merchants
N/A 36,533 bps 14,667 bps
Bandwidth between merchants
and miners
N/A 0.807 bps 0.523 bps
Delta blockchain size / round 2.38 MB 0.000137 MB 0.00011 MB
one escrow per day. In addition to that, in MICROPAY a new escrow must be
created after each winning ticket14.
It should be noted that in both the gaming and CDN examples, we only
account for the cost of operating the service. Factors such as funding Minecraft’s
development team (which was presumably supported by the initial purchase of
the game) or produce the video content that was served by the CDN are not
considered here. In practice, operational costs are minimal compared to the
development cost which can run in the hundreds of millions of dollars [21].
We used this setup to compute overhead of micropayment processing for both
applications, as shown in what follows.
Online Gaming Application We used the configuration parameters outlined
earlier to compute the transaction fees and the bandwidth cost of micropayment
processing in this application. The results are found in Table 3.
We start with the number of transactions the miners process. In Bitcoin, all
micropayments are processed as individual transactions. In contrast, with MI-
CROPAY and MicroCash, only winning tickets and escrow creation transactions
will be sent to the miners. MICROPAY is a sequential scheme, so every time a
ticket wins the escrow breaks. Therefore, the number of escrows per round equals
to the expected number of winning tickets per round. In MicroCash, however,
a player may use one escrow for the duration of their subscription (a month in
our case). Consequently, and as the table shows, MicroCash generates 25% fewer
transactions, accounting both escrow and winning ticket redemption.
14 To simplify the discussion in this section, and since the goal is to evaluate the
financial and bandwidth cost of the payment setup rather than its computational
cost, we allow MicroCash to operate with a non-integer number of winning tickets
per round. This is done by adopting the lottery protocol with independent ticket
winning events described in Appendix A.
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The number of transactions affects the amount of fees miners charge for pro-
cessing. As the table shows, processing micropayments individually is expensive,
costing $680 per round (a transaction costs around $0.068 as mentioned previ-
ously). However, in MicroCash and MICROPAY, the fees are much lower because
they are paid only when claiming winning tickets or creating escrows. Further-
more, due to the reduced number of escrows, MicroCash incurs the least fees,
costing around 75% of what MICROPAY incurs.
In calculating the bandwidth overhead, in Bitcoin players send all micropay-
ments directly to the miners. They do not send anything to the servers nor do
the servers send anything to the miners. On the other hand, in MICROPAY and
MicroCash, all lottery tickets are exchanged locally between players and servers.
Only escrows and winning tickets will be sent to the miners. Based on the av-
erage size of a Bitcoin transaction (around 250 bytes as mentioned earlier), the
size of an escrow transaction in MICROPAY is around 250 bytes, wheares in
MicroCash it is around 327 bytes. This is because our scheme adds additional
fields to store the payment setup parameters as described in Section 4.1. For the
size of a claim transaction, beside the transaction average size, we add the size
of a winning ticket (110 bytes in MicroCash and 355 bytes in MICROPAY). As
shown in Table 3, the bandwidth cost between players/servers and the miners in
Bitcoin is more than 3000x the cost incurred in MICROPAY or MicroCash. This
shows the great benefit of processing payments locally using a micropayment
scheme.
The bandwidth cost of the miners can be used to quantify the increase in the
blockchain size per round since all transactions sent to the miners are logged on
the blockchain. As the table shows, logging all micropayments is prohibitive as it
requires more than 2 MB per round. In Bitcoin, only one block of size 1MB can
be published per round, meaning that paying at this relatively slow rate cannot
be supported. On the other hand, this overhead is reduced to less than 0.00014
MB in MICROPAY and MicroCash.
Peer-assisted CDN Application Because of the larger workload involved,
our results show micropayment schemes offer even more dramatic benefits when
used to serve CDN traffic. As Table 4 shows, in plain Bitcoin, miners process
128 transactions per second, which is the number of data chunks caches serve
per second. This number drops to fractions in MICROPAY, and goes further
down an 50% in MicroCash. This is reflected in both the transaction fees and the
blockchain size.
Processing micropayments individually costs more than $5,000 per round,
while these fees drop to cents when a micropayment scheme is employed. It also
requires logging more than 18 MB per round on the blockchain. This overhead
is reduced to around 0.001 MB in MICROPAY and 0.0005 in MicroCash. This
shows the great advantage of employing a micropayment scheme for heavy loaded
applications, and the benefit of supporting micropayment concurrency (where
MicroCash reduced the additional blockchain size and the total fees by around
50%).
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Table 4: Micropayment overhead in peer-assisted CDNs (a round is 10 min).
Metric Bitcoin MICROPAY MicroCash
Winning tickets / sec N/A 0.001964 0.001964
Escrows / sec N/A 0.001976 0.000012
Transactions /sec 128 0.00394 0.001976
Transaction fees / round $5,222 $0.160769 $0.08062
Bandwidth between customers and
miners
256,000 bps 3.95 bps 0.165 bps
Bandwidth between customers and
merchants
N/A 280,576 bps 112,640 bps
Bandwidth between merchants
and miners
N/A 9.508 bps 6.16 bps
Delta blockchain size / round 18.31 MB 0.000963 MB 0.000452 MB
In terms of bandwidth overhead between participants, in plain Bitcoin the
miners have at least 19,000x the cost when a micropayment scheme is employed.
Moreover, MicroCash incurs almost no bandwidth cost between the publisher and
the miners. This is despite the fact that in this application, an escrow creation
transaction in MicroCash is larger than the one needed in MICROPAY (such a
transaction is around 1,783 bytes in MicroCash, where we consider 45 beneficiary
caches to support the rate of 1Gbps15). Such a minimal cost for MicroCash is
due to payment concurrency as it allows creating a one long-lifetime escrow
instead of large number of escrows, as MICROPAY requires. Even for ticket
exchange, MicroCash incurs a lower cost although both schemes have the same
number of tickets. This is because a ticket (on-chain or off-chain) in MicroCash
is substantially smaller than in MICROPAY.
Key Takeaways: Micropayments are absolutely critical to be able to process
small transactions in modern applications. MicroCash is cost efficient enough to
be used in online gaming and content distribution. Concurrent use of a single
escrow decreases the total data added to the blockchain by roughly half.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce MicroCash, the first decentralized probabilistic frame-
work that supports concurrent micropayments. The design of MicroCash features
an escrow setup and ticket tracking mechanism that permit a customer to rapidly
issue tickets in parallel using only one escrow. Moreover, MicroCash is cost effec-
tive as it implements a non-interactive lottery protocol for micropayment aggre-
gation that is based solely on secure hashing. When compared to the sequential
15 We use the average upload speed in the US [4], which is 22.79 Mbps. Hence, to serve
1Gbps, a publisher needs 45 caches.
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scheme MICROPAY, MicroCash has substantially higher payment processing
rates and much lower bandwidth and on-chain traffic. This demonstrates the
viability of employing our scheme in large-scale micropayment applications.
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A Lottery Protocol With Independent Ticket Winning
Events
In this section, we describe a variant of our lottery protocol that follows the
same paradigm found in previous works [39,35,33,25]. That is, each lottery ticket
enters the lottery independently of other tickets. Thus, there is a chance that
all tickets in a round may win or all lose with an expected number of winning
tickets of ptktrate per round. This protocol can be used in applications where
it is infeasible to set drawlen, p, and tktrate in a way that produces an integer
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number of winning tickets per drawlen rounds, such as the real life applications
discussed in Section 7. In this section, we first introduce this protocol variant,
after which we derive bounds for the payment and penalty escrow balances,
denoted as Bindescrow and B
ind
penalty, respectively, under the modified protocol setup.
A.1 Lottery Protocol Design
The lottery protocol with independent ticket winning events is similar to the one
introduced in Section 4.3 in the sense that it is based solely on secure hashing,
requires the miners to compute a VDF value that is used in the lottery draw,
and defines parameters ddraw and dredeem to control when a ticket can enter the
lottery, and when it can be redeemed if it wins.
However, this protocol differs from one with an exact win rate in three as-
pects. First, given that each ticket enters the lottery independently of others,
there is no restriction that ptktrate be an integer value. Hence, there is no need
for the parameter drawlen. This also affects how the lower bound of B
ind
penalty is
computed, as we will see in Section A.3. Second, given that there is a chance
that more tickets than expected (i.e., > ptktrate lesc) may win, we require that
the payment escrow cover all winning tickets with very high probability, at least
1− for some small  value such as  < 0.05. This affects how the value of Bindescrow
is computed as we will see in Section A.2. And third, we need a different lottery
draw mechanism to allow tickets to enter independently. We elaborate on this
mechanism in what follows.
As before, a merchant keeps a ticket tktL until its lottery draw time tdraw,
which is exactly ddraw rounds after its issue time. Then, after observing the VDF
value of the block mined at that time, the merchant computes the following
quantity over the ticket (where H is a hash function):
htktL = H(idesc||seqno||V DF (Blocktdraw)) (7)
A ticket wins if the least significant word of htktL is less than 2
32p. Therefore,
within the precision allowed by a 32-bit number, a ticket will have a p chance of
winning.
This process is clarified by the example depicted in Figure 6. As shown, the
ticket has been issued at round 30, and hence, it entered the lottery at round
40. The VDF value of the block with index 40 appears inside block 41. Based
on the value of htktL , the ticket in the figure is a winning one.
As before, htktL involves only the ticket fields that are part of the escrow
state that the issuing customer cannot manipulate. These fields do not include
the merchant recipient address, which means that a ticket’s chance of winning
the lottery is not affected by who owns it. Hence, this protocol variant has the
same security properties as the protocol with an exact ticket win rate.
A.2 Computing Bindescrow
In this section, we show how to compute the payment escrow balance Bindescrow
for the lottery protocol with independent ticket winning events that satisfies the
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Fig. 6: Lottery draw example (ddraw = 10, and p = 0.01).
1−  coverage rule. This computation is done using a probabilistic analysis that
relies on modeling the payment process in MicroCash under this protocol. In
what follows, we state and prove a formula to calculate this balance.
Theorem 2. For an escrow with lifetime lesc rounds, ticket issue rate tktrate,
lottery winning probability p, winning ticket currency value β, and parameter ,
where lesc, tktrate ∈ N, β ∈ R+, and 0 ≤ p,  ≤ 1, the value of Bindescrow needed to
cover all winning lottery tickets with probability at least 1 −  under MicroCash
setup with independent ticket winning events is given by:
Bindescrow = βF
−1(p, lesctktrate, 1− ) (8)
where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
binomial distribution parameterized by p and a number of trials t = lesctktrate at
the value 1− .
Proof. Given that we work in the random oracle model, and that we model
the block hashes on the blockchain as a uniform distribution, lottery winning
events are independent and can be modeled as Bernoulli trials. This means that
the total number of winning tickets tied to an escrow with lifetime lesc rounds,
ticket issue rate tktrate, and lottery winning probability p, is a binomial random
variable parameterized by p and a number of trials t = lesctktrate.
Requiring Bindescrow to cover all winning tickets with probability 1 −  means
that Bindescrow must contain sufficient currency to pay a number of winning tickets
ψ that hits the (1−)th percentile of the above binomial distribution, i.e., Bindescrow
= ψβ. This number can be computed as:
ψ = F−1(p, lesctktrate, 1− ) (9)
where F−1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
binomial distribution parameterized by p and a number of trials t = lesctktrate
at the value 1 − . Substituting this expression in Bindescrow = ψβ produces the
formula stated in the theorem above, which completes the proof. uunionsq
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Table 5: Notations II.
Symbol Meaning
κ The number of tickets that can be issued per round, such that τ =tktrate
and τ ∈ N.
w The lottery draw period in rounds, such that w = ddraw and d ∈ N.
x The ticket redemption period in rounds, such that x =dredeem and x ∈ N.
yi Number of duplicated tickets in round i, such that 0 ≤ yi ≤ κ.
υ The escrow lifetime in rounds, such that υ =lesc and υ ∈ N.
A.3 Computing a Lower Bound for Bindpenalty
In this section, we compute a lower bound for the penalty deposit Bindpenalty re-
quired to deter cheating under the lottery protocol with independent ticket win-
ning events. This is done using a similar approach to the one used in Appendix 5,
as it applies the same utility function definition and covered malicious strategies.
In what follows, we present this analysis, which includes stating and proving a
lower bound for Bindpenalty.
Game setup. Similar to before, we have a single player game in which a mali-
cious customer applies the ticket duplication strategy. However, we do not have
the concept of fat rounds, where a round in this protocol is the exact time needed
a single block on the blockchain. This means that the cheating detection period
is ddraw + dredeem rounds. Furthermore, given that tickets enter the lottery in-
dependently of each other, there is a chance that none of the tickets will win.
Thus, duplicating all tickets in a round is an option for a rational customer.
For this reason, in each round of this game, a malicious customer may decide to
duplicate yi sequence numbers, such that yi ∈ {1, . . . , tktrate}.
Table 5 summarizes the new notations we use in this section, beside redefin-
ing a few that appeared in Table 1, to describe this game.
Additional utility gain analysis. We now state and prove a lower bound for
Bindpenalty based on the above game setup.
Theorem 3. For the game and escrow setup described above, issuing invalid or
duplicated lottery tickets is less profitable in expectation than acting in an honest
way if:
Bindpenalty > (m− 1)pβκ
(
1
1− (1− p)κ + w + x− 1
)
(10)
Proof. In MicroCash, a customer can create an escrow with an υ round lifetime.
All tickets issued in a round enter the lottery after w rounds, and all winning
tickets will expire after x rounds from their lottery draw time.
During each round of an escrow lifetime, an honest customer can issue up to
κ tickets with unique sequence numbers. As before, each ticket has an expected
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Fig. 7: Decision process for a 3 round escrow with w = 2 rounds and x = 1
round. Arrows carry probabilities, decisions are found below the states, and the
utility gain is found above the states.
value of pβ coins, which corresponds to the service value a customer obtains for
handing out this ticket.
On the other hand, for each round i ∈ {1, . . . , υ}, a malicious customer would
decide to duplicate yi tickets, where yi ∈ {1, . . . , κ}. If none of the duplicated
tickets win, which happens with probability (1− p)yi , this customer stays in the
system and obtains an additional utility gain of (m−1)pβyi over what an honest
customer would obtain. On the other hand, if any of these tickets win the lottery
at round i+w, which happens with probability 1− (1− p)yi , the customer will
be detected at round i + w + x (the latest). This reduces its additional utility
by Bindpenalty since the miners will revoke its penalty escrow. At this time, the
malicious customer still has x rounds to issue tickets from the time of learning
that it will be caught. Therefore, this customer will choose to duplicate all tickets
in these rounds as described before.
Similar to Section 5, we use a decision process diagram that captures the
decisions a malicious customer makes over an escrow lifetime. As an example,
we consider a simple case where we have an escrow with a 3 round lifetime,
w = 2 rounds, and x = 1 round. The decision process for this setup is captured
in Figure 7.
As shown, the only difference from what we saw in Figure 5, beside dealing
with normal rounds, is the cheating detection probability. So, this process follows
the same logic for deriving the additional utility at each round based on the
likelihood that the cheating will be caught.
We utilize the same recursive idea in analyzing the above decision process.
During the first round of an υ round escrow, a malicious customer will decide to
duplicate y1 tickets. If any of these tickets wins at round 1 +w, cheating will be
detected. Thus, the customer will duplicate all tickets for the next x rounds and
will pay the penalty Bindpenalty. This means that with probability 1− (1−p)y1 , the
utility gain is (m− 1)pβ(∑wi=1 yi + xκ)−Bindpenalty.
If none of the duplicated y1 tickets wins the lottery, the customer stays in
the system. This means that with probability (1 − p)y1 , the utility gain of this
customer will be (m− 1)pβy1 + Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)], where the second term denotes the
expected utility gain of a malicious customer in an υ − 1 round escrow.
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Based on the above, we can express Eυ[u(Cˆ)] as follows:
Eυ[u(Cˆ)] =
(
1− (1− p)y1)((m− 1)pβ w∑
i=1
yi + (m− 1)pβxκ−Bindpenalty
)
+
(1− p)y1
(
(m− 1)pβy1 + Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)]
)
(11)
As before, we have Eυ−1[u(Cˆ)] < 0 since the penalty for an υ−1 round escrow
has been configured in a way that makes cheating unprofitable. Hence, and by
requiring Eυ[u(Cˆ)] < 0 to deter cheating, we find that:
Bpenalty(y1, . . . , yd) > (m− 1)pβ
(
y1
1− (1− p)y1 +
w∑
i=2
yi + xκ
)
(12)
For any w and x value, the above quantity is maximized when yi = κ for
i ∈ {1, . . . , w}.16 Substituting this in equation 12 produces the lower bound
stated in the theorem, which completes the proof. uunionsq
As an example, consider an escrow with a 200 round lifetime, τ = 1000
tickets, p = 0.01, β = 1 coin, m = 5, d = 6, r = 6, and  = 0.01. Applying
equation 8 produces Bescrow = 2, 104 coins, and applying equation 10 produces
Bpenalty > 480 coins. Comparing these values to the ones obtained for the same
example in Section 5, where Bescrow = 2, 000 coins and Bpenalty > 477.6, we
realize that these values re very close. This is because this example uses a long
lifetime escrow and a larger ticket issue rate, which makes these values as close
as possible to the expected values. Consequently, for short escrow lifetime and
lower ticket issue rate, the difference will more dramatic. That is, the bounds
for a lottery protocol with an exact win rate will be much lower, reducing the
collateral cost for the customer.
16 This is done in a similar way to the one found in Section 5.
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